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I 
The agricultural policy of any country necessarily aims 
at the furtherance of the development and prosperity of 
agriculture, but different views are held by scholars as to 
what state of agriculture should be regarded as most de-
veloped and prosperous. At least two different points of view 
have hitherto prevailed on this point. 
One is based, so to speak, on the science of agricultural 
management; it lays special stress on the prosperity of in-
dividual farmers engaged in agricu ltural production. Eco-
nomists of this school attach importance to the productivity 
of unit farm labour, believing, as they do, that the livelihood 
of farmers can be economically improved by increasing it. 
They maintain that the decline of productivity per unit area 
of agricultural land does not matter much but that the 
productivity of unit farm labour must by all means be in-
creased. There are many who· subscribe to this point of 
view. Mr. F. Aereboe, a distinguished German scholar of 
the science of agricultural management, discussing post-
bellum measures for the development of agriculture in his 
country, writes: .. Es kornmt daher alles darauf an, die Pro· 
duktivitat der Landwirtschaft zu steigern, ohne dass deren 
Aufwendungen vermehrt und verteuert werden. Weiter 
muss dieses Ziel auch bei massigen Preisen der Agrarpro-
dukte mit allen Mitteln angestrebt werden. Das wichtigste 
hierbei in Betracht kommende Mittel ist aber die Steigerung 
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der personlichen Leistungen der Landwirte."" He thus em· 
phasises the necessity of increasing the productivity of unit 
labour engaged in farming. Mr. J. S. Davis, an American 
economist, also maintains that an increase in the productivity 
of unit labour engaged in farming is necessary for elevating 
farm standards of living. He writes: .. If one compares 
sections of the United States, or different countries of the 
world, one finds no direct association between a high pro· 
portion engaged in farming and high levels of efficiency in 
agriculture or of farm standards of living. On the whole, 
with some exceptions, the tendency is toward inverse corre· 
lation."" In short, economists of this school of thought con· 
tend that, in order to augment the livelihood of the farming 
class, it is more important to increase the productivity of 
unit farm labour than to increase productivity per unit area 
of farm land. 
The other point of view considers agricultural develop· 
ment and prosperity not only in terms of the interests of 
individual farmers but in terms of the interests of national 
economy as well. Furthermore, while not disregarding the 
special bearing of agriculture on national defence, it takes 
the line that this industry must produce foodstuffs in plenty 
and be capable of maintaining a large farm popUlation of 
good physique. Accordingly, economists of this school can· 
tend that, no matter how high the productivity of unit farm 
labour may stand, the agriculture of a country cannot be 
said to be well developed and prosperous, if productivity per 
unit area of farm land falls so low that the agricultural 
productivity of the country - in particular the production of 
foodstuffs - cannot satisfy the domestic demand, with the 
result that large quantities have to be imported from abroad, 
and if the agricultural population declines considerably in 
1) F. Aereboe, Der Einfluss des Krieges auf die Iandwirtschaftliche 
Produktion in Deutschland, 1927, S. 194. 
2) J. S. Davis, Agricultural Fundamentalism (Economics, Socioiogy and 
the Modern World, Ess'lYS in Honour of E. N. Carver) 1935, p. 18. 
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consequence of a fall in productivity per unit area of farm 
land. 
It may, at first sight, appear at once incongruous and 
impossible for the home production of food crops to be 
inadequate to meet the domestic demand for foodstuffs and 
for the farm population to decline considerably, when the 
productivity of unit labour engaged in farming stands high, 
but, as a matter of fact, such a state of affairs is possible. 
Any doubt on this point may be dispelled, if one stops to 
consider the present state of agriculture in England. Since. 
the industrial revolution, England has subscribed to the 
principle of basing the State economy on commerce and in· 
dustry, leaving agriculture to take care of itself. As a result 
her agricultural interests have suffered severely from the 
heavy inflow of cheap grain from abroad, and her agricultural 
population has gradually dwindled until it now represents 
only eight per cent. of the total. Food crops produced in 
England are inadequate to supply her domestic demand, 
particularly as regards the supply of grain. The domestic 
production of wheat and flour, especially as materials for 
bread, is so poor that it supplies only 21 per cent. of the 
total domestic demand.'" What policy, then, did the British 
agricultural interests adopt in these circumstances? On this 
point, Dr. Kawada writes: ........ but in a country where 
economics are highly developed and commerce and industry 
have attained such a degree of prosperity that they form 
the very basis of the State, agriculture, already intensive, 
will certainly tend to become more extensive. In such cir· 
cumstances, it is inevitable that those who formerly invested 
their capital and labour in agriculture should tend to trans· 
fer their investments to commercial and industrial enterprises 
which are more profitable, leaving agriculture to become 
more extensive. The state of British agriculture in recent 
years is a case in point.'''' We may say, therefore, that the 
3) J. A. Venn, The Foundations of Agricultural Economics, 1935, p. 480. 
4) S. Kawada, Agricultural Economics, p. 152. 
-------.. --------~ 
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British farmer has made farming extensive in order that the 
marginal productivity of farm labour might equipoise at a 
point much higher than before. Hence, although the produc· 
tivity of unit farm labour has certainly been kept high, both 
the agricultural population itself and the production of food· 
stuffs in England have witnessed a marked decline due 
directly to more extensive farming. This state of agriculture 
can hardly be regarded as reflecting a high level of agricul· 
tural development and prosperity. 
Mr. R J Thompson, comparing the productive power of 
agriculture in England and in Denmark, gives, in units of 
hundredweights, the average grain crops per acre for the 
years from 1920 to 1924. According to his figures, wheat 
stands at 17.6, barley at 14.9 and oats at 13.6 in England, 
while in Denmark, wheat is put at 22.9, barley at 18.7 and 
oats at 14.3." From the foregoing, it will be seen that the 
productivity of Danish agriculture per unit area is higher 
than that in England. Mr. Thompson attributes the higher 
productivity of Danish agriculture mainly to the attachment 
of Danish farmers to their lands and partly to the fact that 
they are contented with a lower rate of compensation than 
their British confreres for the money and labour which they 
invest in farming." In other words, Danish farm labour is 
more intensive than British farm labour, and the marginal 
productivity of farm labour is lower in Denmark than in 
England. Yet, no one can claim that British agriculture is 
more developed and prosperous than Danish agriculture. 
Thus, it will be seen that high productivity of unit farm 
labour is not the sole criterion by which to measure the 
degree of agricultural development and prosperity. 
Which of the two types of agricultural development and 
prosperity referred to is the more desirable for Japan? In 
my opinion, the latter type of agricultural development and 
5) R. J. Thompson, The Productivity of British and Danish Farming 
(The Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, March. 1926) p. 219. 
6) Ibid, p. 238. 
24 Y. YAGI 
prosperity is preferable. Needless to say, Japan's agricultural 
population is disproportionately large for her limited area of 
arable land, so much so, in fact, that the average area of 
arable land per farm family is only 1.08 cho (or about 2.45 
acres). In order to support itself upon the revenue derived 
from this small area of farm land, the Japanese farm family 
has had to make its farming intensive. Its constant care has 
naturally been to increase productivity per unit area of arable 
land. It is, indeed, due to the earnest efforts made to main· 
tain and increase productivity per unit area of arable land 
that Japan is now in a position to supply her domestic 
demand for foodstuffs, despite the extensive development of 
her commerce and industry. It is also due to the same 
cause that Japan is able to maintain a higher percentage of 
agricultural population than other countries. Japan's agri· 
cultural population represents 48 per cent. of her total popu· 
lation, whereas the agricultural populations of England, Ger· 
many and France stand at 8, 30 and 38 per cent. respec· 
tively. This relatively large agricultural population not only 
supplies an enormous domestic market for urban commerce 
and industry but constitutes the source of a plentiful supply 
of cheap labour. In England, where the agricultural popula· 
tion has witnessed a marked decrease, the rural population 
cannot be drawn upon to supplement the urban labour 
supply, so that few changes occur in the composition of 
urban labour. Urban labourers; therefore, become rigidly 
. fixed in their trades, and their demands for higher wages 
tend to weaken the economic power of the country; The 
agricultural population of Japan, which, as already mentioned, 
is so large that it represents 48 per cent. of the country's 
total population, is furthermore an important element in 
national defence. Farmers are of good physique and inured 
to hardships and privations. The possession of such sturdy 
people in large numbers is Japan's chief asset, especially in 
war·time. Similarly it is a Source of strength to Japan that, 
while her commerce and industry are maintained in a highly 
developed state, her agriculture is also kept in such a pros· 
. - ---------- -----
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perous condition that she is self-supporting in the matter of 
food supplies while her agricultural population itself continues 
to remain large. All this is ascribable to the maintenance 
at a high level of productivity per unit area of arable land, 
or, in other words, to the maintenance or increase of the 
total productive power of agriculture. Why Germany and 
Italy have recently been making such special efforts to in-
crease agricultural population must be obvious in the light 
of this explanation. 
In the forgoing observation, I have deliberately left the 
question of the demand for agricultural products out of 
consideration. It hardly needs to be emphasized that as a 
country's population increases, the demand for agricultural 
products also grows. In disregard of this circumstance, 
England developed her agriculture extensively, with the 
inevitable result that she is now obliged to import not only 
primary agricultural products but agricultural foodstuffs as 
well largely from her Doininions but also from foreign 
countries. A country like England which has large colonial 
possessions may be able to supply her domestic needs with 
imports from her own Dominions and other possessions, but 
Japan, whose colonial possessions are limited in area, would 
have to rely largely on foreign countries for the supply of 
foodstuffs, shou ld her agriculture ever become very extensive. 
Even conceding that the shortage of food supplies resulting 
from extensive farming might be made good by imports 
from her overseas possessions, such a situation must be 
found far from satisfactory. We urge the necessity of in-
creasing the production of foodstuffs at home, not because 
shipping in the Korean strait and on the Formosan route 
may be exposed to risks in war-time, but because we fear a 
decline in Japan's agrarian population due to extensive 
farming, for it seems inevitable that extensive agriculture 
should cause a decline in the country's agrarian population. 
Another point calling for attention is that whereas, in the 
present Sino-Japanese conflict, large numbers of Japanese 
farmers have joined the colours, no Korean or Formosan 
~~~ .. ------- ----.--------~----------.. 
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farmers are fighting at the front. If agriculture in Japan 
proper should ever become extensive, that in Japan's over· 
seas possessions must necessarily be made intensive and its 
productivity increased in order to make up for a decrease 
in agricultural production at home, so long, of course, as the 
demand for agricultural products remains unchanged. But 
it must be remembered that once agriculture in the colonial 
possessions is made intensive and the markets for the 
resultant increased output become fixed, it will be extremely 
difficult to render it extensive again. Moreover, it must not 
be forgotten that when the war is over, the discharged 
soldiers who return to their country homes will for tbe 
most part resume their agricultural pursuits. Supposing 
that Japanese agriculture which had been rendered extensive 
in war·time should become intensive again after the war 
through the return of these discharged soldiers to the plough, 
over·production would naturally result and friction would 
develop between agriculture in Japan proper and agriculture 
in the overseas possessions. It would, therefore, be poor 
policy to let domestic agriculture become too extensive. In 
war· time, of course, the supply of agricultural products is 
liable to fall short of the demand, and therefore efforts must 
be made to increase the total agricultural production in 
Japan, in the overseas possessions, in Manchuria and North 
China, as a whole, regarding these countries, of course, as 
forming a bloc. In doing so, however, care must be taken 
to see that agriculture in Japan does not suffer in such a 
way that the country's capacity for maintaining an agricul· 
'tural population is seriously impaired. 
Inasmuch as, in war·time, the demand for agricultural 
products shows a tendency to increase and the supply to 
decrease, for the reasons described below, it is important for 
as to make special efforts to maintain or increase the total 
agricultural production in Japan by keeping the yield per 
unit area of arable land unaffected, so far as this is possible. 
The war·t ime agricultural policy must, therefore, necessarily 
aim at the maintenance or increase of the total agricultural 
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production of the countrY, and not at the increase of pro-
ductivity per unit labour engaged in farming. When Mr. F. 
Aereboe urged the necessity of increasing productivity per 
unit farm labour, as noted above, he had in view the post-war 
agricultural policy of Germany; he was not advocating the 
course as fit for agriculture in war·time. 
II 
As I have already explained, the total agricultural pro· 
duction of the country must be maintained or increased in 
war·time by upholding or expanding its total agricultural 
productive power, for, in time of war, the supply of agricul· 
tural products - agricultural foodstuffs especially - is apt to 
fall short of the demand. One may naturally ask why this 
should be the case. 
Let me first consider how the war situation in general 
affects the demand for agricultural products. 
(1) It may, at first sight, appear that what takes place 
in war·time is simply a transfer of soldiers and horses from 
Japan to the front, and that consequently there ought to be 
no change in the total consumption of foodstuffs and forage, 
but the mattar is not so simple as this. No matter how 
efficiently the transportation of foodstuffs and forage is 
carried out at the front, it is absolutely necessary for large 
stocks of supplies to be held in reserve behind the lines, if 
the advancing troops are to be adequately fed at all times. 
This precaution is all the more necessary where few trans· 
portation facilities are available. The further the battle lines 
are extended, the greater must be the stocks held in reserve. 
This circumstance alone brings about an increase in the 
demand for agricultural products. 
(2) The amount of caloric energy which one requires 
physically varies according to the relative violence of one's 
bodily exertions. On the battlefield where soldiers are called 
upon to undertake almost superhuman tasks, they naturally 
need extra caloric energy and consequently a greater quan· 
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tity of nutritious food. It, therefore, follows that in war-
time there is a larger demand not only for rice, barley and 
other grain but for meat and vegetables as welL 
(3) The absorption of farm labour into the munitions 
industry in war-time is another cause for an increase in the 
demand for rice, for farmers who move to town abandon 
their former mixed-cereal diet in favour of a purely rice diet_ 
It is clear from these facts that the demand for agricultural 
foodstuffs must increase in war-time. 
Next, as to the supply aspect of agricultural products: 
(1) In war-time, a large number of farmers join the 
colours, and as· these mobilised soldiers are all men in the 
prime of manhood, their calling-up causes a marked decline 
in farm labour man power. The loss is particularly severe 
in the case of families, in which the father is called up. 
(2) In war-time, a large number of horses are comman-
deered, and this is bound to affect agricultural efficiency, for it 
is commonly held that the labour power of one horse is equi-
valent to that of four men. At the end of 1935, the number 
of horses over four years old in Japan stood at 1,180,000, of 
which the Hokkaido and the six North-Eastern prefectures 
supplied 490,000. The shortage of horse power wiII be felt 
with especial keenness in the North- Eastern districts where 
the period of agricultural production is short and where, 
consequentry, all farming operations have to be carried out 
within a limited period of time_ 
(3) As, in war-time, a certain portion of the available 
farm labour is naturally· absorbed by the prosperous muni-
tions industry, the shortage of labour in the agrarian 
districts tends to be accentuated_ 
(4) As more sulphate of ammonia factories will be con-
verted into munitions factories, as the war drags on, there 
is a further fear that the supply of nitrated fertiliser may 
fall short of the demand_ Again, the shortage of farm labour 
wiII reduce the output of manure from mown grass, while 
the requisitioning of horses will likewise diminish the pro-
duction of farmyard fertilisers_ 
~~~-.------------
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This shortage in the supply of labour, in animal power 
and in fertiliser will eventually compel agriculture to become 
more extensive, with a corresponding decrease in the total 
supply of agricultural products. Such being the case, every 
effort must be made in war·time to adjust the demand and 
supply of· agricultural products through the maintenance of 
the total productivity of agriculture, so as to preclude a 
rise in the price of agricultural produce resulting from a 
shortage in supply. 
But as Japan has a considerable surplus of farm labour 
in time of peace, both seasonally and absolutely, the shortage 
of farm labour caused by the mobilisation of farmers will 
tend to be relatively far smaller, as compared with certain 
other countries, which have practically no surplus farm 
labour or are even somewhat short of it in ordinary times. 
Moreover, as Japan - taking Japan proper and her colonial 
possessions together - enjoys self·sufficiency in the supply 
of foodstuffs in time of peace, she will be secure from that 
disastrous food shortage which, during the world war, so 
harassed those European countries which were dependent on 
outside sources for their foodstuffs. It cannot be denied, 
however, that, as hostilities continue and assume ever larger 
dimensions, the supply of agricultural products is bound to 
decrease to a greater or less extent. Adequate measures to 
meet such a situation must therefore be devised in good 
time. 
In conjunction with the tendency for tne supply of agri· 
cultural foodstuffs to decline in war·time, careful attention 
ought to be directed also to the possibility of fluctuations in 
the annual yields of certain agricultural crops. Weather 
conditions cannot be favourable every year. Furthermore, 
as a bumper crop involves the extraction of much nutriment 
from the soil, it is usual for bumper years to be followed by 
a few lean years. The following analysis of the rice crop 
illustrates this truth ;--
---~-... __ .--._---------------
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Table No.1. 
The yield of rice per unit area in 
Japan and its oversea possessions. 
I Yield per 'an (0.245 acres) (In the cases of Formosa, 
per kOlJ) 
Years 
I Japan Korea Formosa 






1896 I 1.29 
1897 , 1.18 , 
1898 1.68 
1899 1.39 
1900 1.46 6.80 
1901 1.64 8.93 
1902 1.29 8.43 
1903 1.62 9.60 
1904 1.78 10.07 
1905 1.32 9.43 
1906 1.59 839 
1907 1.68 9.27 
1908 1.77 9.43 
1909 1.78 9.37 
1910 1.58 0.76 8.60 
1911 1.73 0.82 9.09 
1912 1.67 0.76 8.15 
1913 1.65 0.83 10.05 
1914 1.87 0.95 8.94 
1915 1.83 0.85 9.45 
1916 1.90 0.91 9.56 
1917 1.77 0.89 10.05 
1918 1.76 0.98 9.29 
1919 1.95 0.82 9.60 
1920 2.02 0.95 9.39 
1921 1.76 0.93 9.74 
1922 1.93 0.96 10.33 
1923 1.76 0.97 929 
1924 1.81 0.83 11.09 
1925 1.89 0.93 11.34 
1926 1.76 0.96 10.62 
1927 1.95 1.08 11.43 
1928 1.88 0.89 11.26 
1929 1.85 0.84 11.06 
1930 2.06 1.15 11.63 
1931 1.70 0.94 !I.44 
1932 , 1.85 0.99 13.06 
1933 I 2.23 1.07 12.00 
1934 1.63 0.97 13.21 
1935 1.79 1.05 13.03 
1936 2.10 1.21 13.60 
1937 2.06 1.63 13.62 
1) One ko is equivalent to 2.22 
acres. 
2) One koku is equivalent to 4.963 
bushels. 
As will be seen from the 
above table, rice was a hum-
per crop in 1894, and it was 
not until 1898 that a more 
abundant crop was harvested. 
Similarly a crop heavier 
than that of 1904 was not 
harvested until 1909_ Again, 
it was not until 1930 that 
the country enjoyed a rice 
crop more abundant than that 
of 1920_ It is also on record 
that the unprecedentedly rich 
harvests in 1933 was followed 
by two years of poor har-
vests. A similar tendency was 
observable in Korea also. In 
Eormosa, where rice is har-
vested twice a year, the con-
trast has not been so marked, 
though the same tendency is 
nevertheless noticeable. Inas-
much as the rice crop in Japan 
was fairly abundant last year 
and that in Korea and in 
Formosa particularly so, there 
is no occasion for excessive 
optimism regarding the pros-
pects of the rice harvest this 
year. All necessary measures 
must, therefore, be earnestly 
considered to provide against 
a possible failure of the rice 
crop. 
. - --_._------ _.--_ .. ----_. 
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III 
In war·time. efforts must. of course. be made to main-
tain or even to expand the total productive power of agri· 
culture. but as the total productivity tends to decline owing 
to the shortage of labour and animal power. it may be sug· 
gested that mechanical power should be utilised to make up 
for this shortage. In this connection. however. the following 
factors ought to be duly considered. (1) In view of the 
fact that in war·time machinery manufacturing plants are 
mobilised and transformed into munitions factories. the out· 
Table No.2. 
Distribution of agricultural implements. 
(At the end of November, 1935.) 
Kinds 
Motor cultivators {Cable-type cultivators Tractors 
. . {Sprayers Motor horticultural machmes Fruit-selectors 
Motor fertilizer machines (for pulverising, 
pounding and mixing) 
Thrashing machines 
Hulling machines (rice) 
Hulling machines (barley, wheat, etc.) 
Rice-cleaning machines 
































Note; The figures in the above table were taken from the Report of 
an inquiry m3.de by the Agricultural Affairs Bureau and published in March, 
1937. 
.---~~-
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put of the agricultural implement industry is naturally im-
peded. (2) In Japanese agriculture, it is difficult to mecha-
nise the entire process of production. 
It is very difficult to mechanise the process of cultiva-
tion, because, in Japanese agriculture, not only are farming 
operations conducted on a small scale but individual farm 
families have their fields. scattered in different places, instead 
of having them grouped around one center." For this reason, 
mechanisation in Japanese agriculture has so far been largely 
confined to harvesting operations such as thrashing and 
hulling, to working up agricultural products and to irrigation 
and drainage, rather than to cultivation in the narrower 
sense. This is indicated in the table. No.2. 
Table No.3. 
The local distribution of grain processing machines. 
Average number I Average area of 
Total number of farm families arable land to 
of thrashing and to which one rhich one machine 
hulling machines machine is is allotted 
allotted (In cho*) 
Hokkaido 24.150 8 8 
Tohoku 10,716 59 52 (North-East) 
Kwanto 26.880 33 15 
Hokuriku 54,507 7 6 
Tosan 4,260 101 36 
Tokai 11,155 42 20 
Kinki 15.170 37 21 
Chilgoku 40,705 15 8 
Shikoku 7,681 48 19 




Total 209,982 26 15 
Note: One cho is equivalent to 2.45 acres. 
7) In a plantation at Kojima-gun, Okayama prefecture, a large number 
of small-sized tractors are being employed. but this is an exceptional case . 
.. - .. _---_ .. -._- - ---
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In the processes of agricultural production which can· 
cern thrashing and hulling of grains and the working up of 
agricultural products, mechanisation has made some progress. 
Moreover, as it is comparatively easy to put machines into 
wider use in these particular processes, it is to be hoped 
that no serious shortage of labour will be experienced in 
this connection. Mechanisation in these processes is far 
from being either general or uniform, as can easily be seen 
from the distribution of thrashing and hulling machines in 
different districts, as given in the table. No.3. 
Thrashing and hulling machines are distributed through· 
out the country on the average at the rate of one per 15 
cha of arable land, but in the North·Eastern districts we 
have only one machine per 52 chao Other circumstances 
being the same, therefore, it is obvious that a shortage of 
labour will bear very heavily on these districts. 
As compared with the processes concerned with the 
thrashing and hulling of grains or the working up of agrari· 
an products, the organic processes such as field cultivation, 
sowing, the transplanting of young rice, manuring, weeding 
and reaping, afford little room for mechanisation, and there· 
fore the war· time shortage of farm labour and animal power 
will be felt most keenly at these stages. (1) The shortage 
of labour will affect the work of sowing and rice plimting 
in particular, as the time allocated to these operations is 
both rigidly fixed and limited. This is especially so in the 
North·East and in the Hokuriku district, where rice·planting 
operations have to be completed in so short a period that 
the farmer cannot alter the date of the process to su it his 
own convenience. (2) The work of tilling the fields, pre· 
paring arable lands or weeding can be accelerated or defer· 
red within limits and according to circumstances, so that 
the effect of the shortage of labour is not likely to be so 
disastrous. (3) Similarly, it is comparatively easy to can· 
trive to avoid the keen edge of the shortage of labour as 
regards irrigation, drainage and weeding operations and in 
- --- -- _.- -~ -----
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the harvesting and marketing 
of vegetables, through a pro· 
per use of the labour availa~le, 
since these operations are 
spread over a fairly long peri· 
ad and the amount of labour 
required daily is relatively 
small, though the total requi· 
site volume of labour may be 
large. For irrigation and 
drainage purposes, motor 
pumps are already fairly 
widely used, and it is desir· 
able that they should be 
utilised even more extensively 
in order to make up for the 
war·time shortage of labour. 
Again, as the following 
table shows, the amount of 
labour required during the 
entire course of production, 
from preparation of the land 
for sowing to the harvesting 
of the crop, varies greatly 
according to the kind of 
crops sown. 
Thus, the amount of 
labour required differs can· 
siderably according to the 
crop, and the war·time 
Table No.4. 
Labour power requisite for the cultiva-
lion of one tan of land under various 
crops. (In" the number of persons 
employed" a day's work is calculated 




Marsh-grown rice 25.7 






















shortage of labour tends to cause a transition from the more 
intensive to the more extensive crops. But this variation 
must not be left to the discretion of individual farm families, 
for, in that case, the war·time requirements of the State 
might not be adequately met. In time of war, therefore, 
stricter official control than is practised in time of peace 
must be exercised over agricultural production and manage· 
.-----.----... ~- ---
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ment in order to maintain or possibly to increase the total 
productivity of Japanese agriculture_ In this connection, 
the following measures may be suggested:-
(1) In the first place, co-operative work should be en-
couraged to make up for the shortage of labour_ By pro-
moting co-operative activities in the various stages of agri-
cultural production, viz_ in the preparation of the rice-beds, 
in the planting of the rice, in the cultivation of the fields, 
in weeding and in reaping, and also in the work of thrash-
ing, working up and packing agricultural products, labour 
efficiency must be enhanced_ Such measures will also help 
to ensure the proper adjustment of the demand and supply 
of labour in respect of individual farm families and in each 
hamlet. Fortunately, Japan has numerous agridultural ex-
ecutive guilds - small societies of farmers - which are in a 
position to direct such co-operative action, and it is desirable 
that these guilds, which totalled 133,000 in April, 1933, 
should display even greater activity in war-time_ It is 
equally desirable that the "public labour service organisa-
tions" which are at present at work in all villages, should 
be properly linked to. the programme of the local agricultural 
executive guilds and thus encouraged to greater activities 
along these lines_ Particularly desirable is it that the local 
agricultural executive guilds should undertake to draw up 
agricultural plans and implement their execution for the 
benefit of the farm families where the father is at the front_ 
The agricultural societies and farmers' co-operative societies 
(sangyo kumiai) with which these guilds are affiliated should 
also give them the necessary co-operation and guidance_ 
Further, a redoubled activity on the part of utilisation guilds 
is called for in order that the shortage of animal and 
mechanical power may be adequately offset. 
(2) Since many able-bodied men in the prime of man-
hood must necessarily join the colours in war-time, the 
labour of old men and women - the labour of women es-
pecially - acquires special importance in agricultural pur-
suits_ The participation of women in Japanese agriculture 
. --_._---------- -----_. 
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is shown in the following table;-
Table No.5. 
Ratio of men and women employed in agricultural work. 
Total Classified Ratio 
number , Men Women Men Women 
% % 
Farm workers 14,140 7,743 6,397 34.8 43.2 
(AgriCulture 13.549 7,454 6,095 53.0 45.0 
Stock-farming 61 45 16 73.8 26.2 
Sericulture 355 99 256 27.9 72:1 
Forestry 115 145 30 82.9 17.1 
Note: The figures in the above table were taken __ rom the 1930 Census 
Report. 
It will be seen from the above table that women can· 
stitute 45 per cent. of the total of purely agricultural work-
ers, while in sericulture, for example, they represent 72 per 
cent. of the total employed, 
Table No.6. 
Working days and hours of agricultural workers, classified according 
to sex and age. 
Working days Working hours per day 
of work 
Men Women B Men Women 
I 
.B 
(AJ (B) A (A) (B) A 
days days hours hours 
Under 15 75.1 50.4 61 6.5 6.1 93 
16-20 185.7 139.8 75 8.5 1.6 89 
21-30 238.0 196.7 83 82 7.7 93 
31-SO 241.0 209.6 81 9.0 1.9 88 
51-60 2512 163.2 65 8.1 6.8 78 
61-10 187.8 130.1 69 8.3 5.1 69 
Over 71 199.5 40.3 20 5.8 5.0 86 
Average 196.9 132.8 67 7.9 6.7 85 
Note: The figures in the above table were worked out from the figures 
mentioned on pp. 169 -171 in a book entitled "Various Problems of Agri-
cultural Management" by Mr. Yukio Ishibashi. 
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The working days per year and working hours per day 
for male and female farm workers, classified according to 
age, are given in the above table. 
On the average, women's working days represent 67 per 
cent. of the working days for men, and their working hours 
per day 85 per cent. That women work fewer days and 
for shorter hours is due, apart from physical conditions 
peculiar to women such as childbirth, etc., to the fact that 
they have to attend to household duties such as cooking and-
the care of children. If, therefore, the shortage of male 
labour is to be compensated for by female labour, it will be 
necessary to relieve women of the burden of domestic work 
by providing public nurseries and common kitchens. Care 
must be taken, however, to avoid putting such a heavy 
burden of farm labour on women that their health may be 
impaired. 
(3) In war·time, the supply of agricultural products is 
apt to fall short of the demand, causing prices to rise. It 
is, therefore, important that everything possible should be 
done to maintain and expand the total agricultural produc· 
tivity so that the demand and supply of agricultural pro-
ducts may be properly adjusted through an increased total 
agricultural production. This provides the best means of 
checking a rise in the prices of agricultural products. In 
order to cope successfully with the exigencies of prolonged 
warfare, it is necessary (1) to ensure the smooth supply of 
agricultural products for military use by increasing· produc-
tion, (2) to expand the production of those agricultural pro-
ducts, the export of which will tend to improve the balance 
of international accounts, and (3) to secure such an ade-
quate supply of agricultural foodstuffs as will ensure the 
livelihood of the nation. With the above·mentioned objects 
in view, a careful inquiry must be made into (1) the kinds 
of crops whose production should he increased, (2) those 
whose production should be maintained at the present level, 
and (3) those for which other crops should be substituted. 
On the basis of this inquiry, agricultural production in the 
---- -----
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individual villages must be properly controIled. Thus it 
follows that agricultural production calls for stricter control 
in war-time than in peace-time. In this regard, the' following 
two points deserve careful consideration:-
Firstly, in order to stabilize national life in war-time, 
it is essential that agricultural products, foodstuffs especially, 
should be supplied to consumers at moderate prices. It -is, 
indeed, incumbent on farmers to give practical expression 
to their patriotism iJ;! war-time and to try to sell their pro-
duce at the lowest possible prices. On the other hand, ex-
cessively low prices for agricultural products may cause 
insecurity in farm life and may seriously hamper the pro-
ductive activity of the whole farming class. What is most 
important is that the prices of agricultural products should 
be maintained at a proper level, so that the livelihood of the 
consumer may not be seriously imperilled on the one hand, 
or excessive pressure put on the farmer' on the other. 
Again, in order to enable farmers to lower the prices of 
their products, the cost of agricultural production itself must 
be reduced. From this point of view, pertinent measures 
must be taken to keep at a proper level the price of fertil-
iser, the price of the farmer's domestic necessities, and farm 
rentals, which constitute the main items of the cost of living 
in the agricultural sphere. 
Secondly, as regards the increased production of agri-
cultural products and the control of production, concrete 
plans for the agricultural production for each region must 
be drawn up, in accordance with the principle of the right 
crop for the right soil, and bearing in mind the problems of 
interdependence due to the organization of the economic bloc 
composed of Japan, the overseas possessions, Manchoukuo 
and North China. In this connection, pertinent State control 
must be enforced concerning the kinds and quantities of 
agricultural crops to be produced in each region, so as to 
preclude friction between the agricultural interests of the 
different regions. In view of the fact that a great many 
Japanese farmers are at the front, it is particularly important 
- -------_ .. _- - --_ .. -_ ...... _-
AGRICULTURAL POLlCY [N WAR·TIME 39 
to see that Japanese ogriculture is not rendered more ex· 
tensive in character and the country's capacity for ac· 
commodating a farming population thereby reduced. 
In short, a war-time agricultural policy must aim at the 
maintenance and expansion of the total agricultural produc-
tivity of the country in the definite and limited sense of 
upholding and increasing total agricultural production . 
.. _----------------
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